LATEST ECONOMIC BRIEFINGS
EMIRATES: ABU DHABI | 02.09.2010
Regulations enforcing higher capital standards in the UAE’s overcrowded insurance market have reduced the amount of insurance brokers, while slower growth in commercial business means the sector is looking to opportunities in the retail segment.
BAHRAIN | 30.08.2010
Bahrain is working hard to bolster its medical services, investing in new facilities and looking to increase the number of trained health professionals, though a rapidly growing population and an increase in lifestyle-related illnesses will continue to add to the demands placed on the nation’s health care resources.
BULGARIA | 30.08.2010
Prospective investors took note when it was announced in late July 2010 that Bulgaria’s largest steelmaker, Kremikovtzi, will be up for sale in mid-September 2010. The news comes four months after the company went into liquidation and a year after major creditors refused to approve a rescue plan for the ailing company.
EGYPT | 30.08.2010
The Egyptian Exchange 30 (EGX30), Cairo’s main stock market index, has had something of a volatile year in 2010, as it rallied through the first quarter, declined through much of the second and began to stage a moderate recovery in the third.
KUWAIT | 30.08.2010
Despite its relatively small population, Kuwait is firmly placed among the world’s most attractive and popular markets for international retail franchises. With a strong consumer and shopping culture and a young, growing and affluent population with an affinity for international brands, Kuwait offers an attractive market for leading retailers seeking to expand their footprint.
COUNTRY COVERAGE
Fighting for the Fair
Morocco, Volume 21
20.10.2003
20.10.2003
The new parliamentary session in Morocco got off to a dramatic start this year, with King Mohamed VI using his opening speech to push reform of the Moudawana (the Family or Personal Code) to the top of the political agenda. Yet, while this piece of legislation now seems ordained, putting it into practice may prove a trickier proposition.
The King used the final report of the Moudawana reform commission, elaborated during the past year, as his reference. Should the new laws be passed, this would represent a major step forward in improving women’s status in Morocco.
Many Moroccans seemed relieved at the King’s speech too – particularly when recollecting the crisis that confronted the previous attempt at reform.
Back in 2000, reform of the Moudawana seemed to end up on indefinite hold, after the reform project, led by Said Saudi, was hijacked by demonstrations by Islamist parties in March 2000. An unprecedented coalition of the main legal (Al Adler we Tania, PJD) and illegal (Al Adel wall Insane, PJB) Islamist parties found common cause in opposition to the reform and with a 1m-strong show of force in Casablanca overwhelmed a pro-reform march in Rabat. Careful of alienating a rising Islamic political presence, and unwilling to force through a reform which looked likely to prove socially destabilising, the project was filed away for more propitious times.
The core problematic – the poor and institutionally inferior and discriminated status of women – was in many senses twisted for political ends. The Islamist parties were not keen to see the problem resolved by the leftist parties (Saadi was in fact a member of the ex-communist PPS, and the government was led by the socialist USFP’s Abderrahmane Youssoufi), and mobilised against the modernist agenda for its lack of sensitivity to Islam.
So, the fundamental problem is religious sensibilities. Any reform that targets family relations is dealing directly with Islam, as it is largely concerned with a moral, personal code of conduct. This, many argue, is why the subject is so sensitive – there are conservatives who are ready to use and abuse their religion to maintain the present Moudawana as a religiously validated code. There are equally Muslims who fight for the code to be changed and see it as at the core of social injustice.
Those opposed to the reform call it an imposition of Western values, lumping it together with other secularist attempts to undermine Morocco’s society. Laicite, as the French call it, has a strong resonance in Morocco – the modern French political system, which clearly splits religion from politics, is alternately scorned or aspired to by Moroccans.
The Islamic opponents’ message, put simply, is this – the West, with a proliferation of divorces, single parenthood, and nuclear families, should not be telling us how to conduct our family life. The more sophisticated critics of Western-style feminism point to strong women’s rights within Islam.
At best, the reform played hostage to politico-religious semantics; at worst, women were kept legally discriminated against by those using the banner of tradition to defend the status quo. But with a King who has made his pro-women’s rights credentials known in numerous speeches and acts, the trend was perhaps inevitable.
Dating back to the late 1950s, the present (and soon to be reformed) Moudawana is often considered an anachronism in today’s Morocco: the family falls under the husband’s responsibility, the wife has an obligation to obey, the husband is able to repudiate his marriage and throw his wife and children on the streets, and polygamy is accepted as the husband’s prerogative.
The new commission, formed at the end of 2002 and headed by Mohamed Boucetta, managed to hammer out a reform that pleased both modernists and traditionalists. Indeed the King himself defended this reform in a speech that borrowed heavily from his religion. “I cannot authorise that which God has prohibited,” he stated, “nor forbid that which God has authorised.” The reform’s core logic is equality between men and women based on the Ijtihad.
The new reform is quite comprehensive and far reaching. In an excellent summary in TelQuel, Maria Daif and Laetitia Grotti outlined the reforms: 18 as the equal marriage age (preventing the practice of marrying of teenage daughters); the partner’s consent (minimising the risk of forced arranged marriages); marriage falls under the couple’s mutual direction (no more patriarchal households); a sharing of goods; polygamy is rendered difficult (the husband must demonstrate to a judge both the necessity of a second wife and his ability to look after both spouses properly); divorce by repudiation is allowed, but by both partners – and the husband must show that he can carry out his divorce duties towards his wife and children.
Critics still point to deficiencies – heritage rights, whereby sons are entitled to twice their sister’s parental inheritance (though grandchildren can inherit equally); women who bear children out of wedlock cannot demand paternity rights for their children (unless the couple were engaged).
But there is general agreement that this reform is nigh on revolutionary for the country. It demands a comprehensive change in mentalities, and goes some way to giving women the legal status that their socio-economic position requires – in a country where 40% of women are now part of the workforce (the figure would be higher if it included informal work), yet only 37% are literate.
To move from legislation to execution, the King has already demanded that the Minister of Justice Mohamed Mouzoubaa prepare the establishment of family courts. These will serve as judicial arbitrators in all matters related to the code, depriving many adouls of their previous monopoly on such matters on the basis of their reading of the sharia.
There is also a strong measure of consensus. The Islamists have been on the back foot since the May terrorist attacks, and most have changed their tack from outright opposition to claims that they had demanded the reforms in any case. Religious sensitivity in the new reform has also lessened their concerns. Some of the more outspoken feminists meanwhile have accepted the reforms pragmatically as a first step in the right direction.
The reforms will require more than legislature and judicial oversight. Concerning as it does family relations, no less is proposed than a complete overhaul of the gender relationship in Morocco. Long term male prerogatives are being challenged, and the struggle is a nuanced battle between modernists and traditionalists, feminists and Islamists – although the boundary lines are frayed.
As Khalid Jamai, journalist at le Journal Hebdomadaire put it, women do not have a problem, it is the men. A legacy of patriarchal culture has been infused and justified with conservative Muslim precepts – using a literal reading of various religious texts to justify the subordination of women. In that sense, the reform’s realisation will basically require a change of mentality – the slowest type of social reform. Ultimately it will depend on improved education and literacy rates.
By invoking the Ijtihad, King Mohamed VI is proposing to follow the spirit of Islamic law, rather than a literal and strict interpretation of the hadith. In so doing, he gives himself room to out-manoeuvre Islamic opponents and confirm his position as leader of the faithful.
It is nevertheless the Islamic opposition’s acceptance of this interpretation that will be decisive for the reform to have a real impact. With their wide support, their validation of the Moudawana’s reform will go some way to helping Moroccans accept the changes now being proposed.
An interesting time ahead, it seems, for married life in Morocco.
Chris de Oliveira
The King used the final report of the Moudawana reform commission, elaborated during the past year, as his reference. Should the new laws be passed, this would represent a major step forward in improving women’s status in Morocco.
Many Moroccans seemed relieved at the King’s speech too – particularly when recollecting the crisis that confronted the previous attempt at reform.
Back in 2000, reform of the Moudawana seemed to end up on indefinite hold, after the reform project, led by Said Saudi, was hijacked by demonstrations by Islamist parties in March 2000. An unprecedented coalition of the main legal (Al Adler we Tania, PJD) and illegal (Al Adel wall Insane, PJB) Islamist parties found common cause in opposition to the reform and with a 1m-strong show of force in Casablanca overwhelmed a pro-reform march in Rabat. Careful of alienating a rising Islamic political presence, and unwilling to force through a reform which looked likely to prove socially destabilising, the project was filed away for more propitious times.
The core problematic – the poor and institutionally inferior and discriminated status of women – was in many senses twisted for political ends. The Islamist parties were not keen to see the problem resolved by the leftist parties (Saadi was in fact a member of the ex-communist PPS, and the government was led by the socialist USFP’s Abderrahmane Youssoufi), and mobilised against the modernist agenda for its lack of sensitivity to Islam.
So, the fundamental problem is religious sensibilities. Any reform that targets family relations is dealing directly with Islam, as it is largely concerned with a moral, personal code of conduct. This, many argue, is why the subject is so sensitive – there are conservatives who are ready to use and abuse their religion to maintain the present Moudawana as a religiously validated code. There are equally Muslims who fight for the code to be changed and see it as at the core of social injustice.
Those opposed to the reform call it an imposition of Western values, lumping it together with other secularist attempts to undermine Morocco’s society. Laicite, as the French call it, has a strong resonance in Morocco – the modern French political system, which clearly splits religion from politics, is alternately scorned or aspired to by Moroccans.
The Islamic opponents’ message, put simply, is this – the West, with a proliferation of divorces, single parenthood, and nuclear families, should not be telling us how to conduct our family life. The more sophisticated critics of Western-style feminism point to strong women’s rights within Islam.
At best, the reform played hostage to politico-religious semantics; at worst, women were kept legally discriminated against by those using the banner of tradition to defend the status quo. But with a King who has made his pro-women’s rights credentials known in numerous speeches and acts, the trend was perhaps inevitable.
Dating back to the late 1950s, the present (and soon to be reformed) Moudawana is often considered an anachronism in today’s Morocco: the family falls under the husband’s responsibility, the wife has an obligation to obey, the husband is able to repudiate his marriage and throw his wife and children on the streets, and polygamy is accepted as the husband’s prerogative.
The new commission, formed at the end of 2002 and headed by Mohamed Boucetta, managed to hammer out a reform that pleased both modernists and traditionalists. Indeed the King himself defended this reform in a speech that borrowed heavily from his religion. “I cannot authorise that which God has prohibited,” he stated, “nor forbid that which God has authorised.” The reform’s core logic is equality between men and women based on the Ijtihad.
The new reform is quite comprehensive and far reaching. In an excellent summary in TelQuel, Maria Daif and Laetitia Grotti outlined the reforms: 18 as the equal marriage age (preventing the practice of marrying of teenage daughters); the partner’s consent (minimising the risk of forced arranged marriages); marriage falls under the couple’s mutual direction (no more patriarchal households); a sharing of goods; polygamy is rendered difficult (the husband must demonstrate to a judge both the necessity of a second wife and his ability to look after both spouses properly); divorce by repudiation is allowed, but by both partners – and the husband must show that he can carry out his divorce duties towards his wife and children.
Critics still point to deficiencies – heritage rights, whereby sons are entitled to twice their sister’s parental inheritance (though grandchildren can inherit equally); women who bear children out of wedlock cannot demand paternity rights for their children (unless the couple were engaged).
But there is general agreement that this reform is nigh on revolutionary for the country. It demands a comprehensive change in mentalities, and goes some way to giving women the legal status that their socio-economic position requires – in a country where 40% of women are now part of the workforce (the figure would be higher if it included informal work), yet only 37% are literate.
To move from legislation to execution, the King has already demanded that the Minister of Justice Mohamed Mouzoubaa prepare the establishment of family courts. These will serve as judicial arbitrators in all matters related to the code, depriving many adouls of their previous monopoly on such matters on the basis of their reading of the sharia.
There is also a strong measure of consensus. The Islamists have been on the back foot since the May terrorist attacks, and most have changed their tack from outright opposition to claims that they had demanded the reforms in any case. Religious sensitivity in the new reform has also lessened their concerns. Some of the more outspoken feminists meanwhile have accepted the reforms pragmatically as a first step in the right direction.
The reforms will require more than legislature and judicial oversight. Concerning as it does family relations, no less is proposed than a complete overhaul of the gender relationship in Morocco. Long term male prerogatives are being challenged, and the struggle is a nuanced battle between modernists and traditionalists, feminists and Islamists – although the boundary lines are frayed.
As Khalid Jamai, journalist at le Journal Hebdomadaire put it, women do not have a problem, it is the men. A legacy of patriarchal culture has been infused and justified with conservative Muslim precepts – using a literal reading of various religious texts to justify the subordination of women. In that sense, the reform’s realisation will basically require a change of mentality – the slowest type of social reform. Ultimately it will depend on improved education and literacy rates.
By invoking the Ijtihad, King Mohamed VI is proposing to follow the spirit of Islamic law, rather than a literal and strict interpretation of the hadith. In so doing, he gives himself room to out-manoeuvre Islamic opponents and confirm his position as leader of the faithful.
It is nevertheless the Islamic opposition’s acceptance of this interpretation that will be decisive for the reform to have a real impact. With their wide support, their validation of the Moudawana’s reform will go some way to helping Moroccans accept the changes now being proposed.
An interesting time ahead, it seems, for married life in Morocco.
Chris de Oliveira
